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IN THE SUPREME C.QURT 
of the 
S'TATE OF UTAH 
ALFR.ED R,OGER MOORE, 
Respondent, 
-vs.-
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE 
WESTERN RAILROAD 
C·O·MP ANY, a corporation, 
Appellant. 
BRIEF OF' RESPONDENT 
Case No. 8284 
PRELIMINAR.Y STATEMENT· 
·The parties will be referred to as in the Court below. 
All italics are ours. 
Throughout appellant's brief, isolated bits of testi-
mony have been lifted out of context and given a mean-
ing different than that intended by the witness. This is 
especially true of Dr. Reed S. Clegg's testimony. Appel-
lant's brief also contains many statements as fact which 
were in serious dispute between the witnesses. Rather 
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than to take the negative and defensive p-osition which 
would be necessary in order to single out instance by in-
stance these transgressions on the part of appellant 
we shall m·ake a comprehensive statement of facts. 
The event, resulting in injuries to pl·aintiff, occurred 
while he was engaged in the performance of his duties 
as a se:ction laborer at Range, ·Colorado, at approximately 
3 :00 o'·clock p.m .. , on the 9th day of August, 1951. 
His ·action was filed in the Third Judicial District 
C·ourt, in and for Salt Lake County, St·ate of Utah, on the 
1st day of F:ebruary, 19·53. The case was tried the first 
time before Judge Clarence E. Baker, and the jury re-
turned a verdict for plaintiff in the sum of $'12,500.00. 
The trial court set aside this ver·dict and granted a new 
trial. The case 0ame on for trial the second time before 
Judge Martin M. Larson and on the 30th day of June, 
1954 the jury returned a verdict in the net amount of 
$17,500.00. The trial court entered judgment on the ver-
dict and subs.equently denied defendant's motion for a 
new trial. 
S.TATEMENT OFI FACTS . 
A~fred Roger Moore was 34 years of age at the time 
of trial. He had had a tenth grade education (R. 9). 
After leaving school his first job was that of feeding 
cattle for a rancher at Greeley, Colorado (R. 9). There-
afte'r he sp·ent seven and a half years in the Navy as a 
signalman (R. 10). After resigning from the Navy he 
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worked for the American Express, handling shipments 
(R. 10), and then {lor Blue Ribbon Bakers at Greeley, 
Colorado carrying shipments and loading trucks (R. 11). 
After that he spent two and one-half years working for 
Benton Land & Livestock Company at Burns, C·olorado, 
feeding livestock, pitching hay, shoveling and irrigating 
(R. 11). Tlhereafter he leased several small places and 
bought a small herd of sheep (R. 12). In March of 1950 
he hired out as a section laborer for The Denver and 
Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, at Burns, Colo-
rado (R. 12). He was earning approximately $256.00 
per month (R. 13). -t\,.s a section l~aborer his work con-
sisted of raising track, handling ties, using a spike maul 
and shoveling (R. 13). During the time that he worked 
for the railroad company he handled his. sheep and irri-
gated his leased pasture lands during off hours (R. 14). 
On August 9, 19·51 plaintiff's shift was 8 :00 a.m., to 
4 :30 p.m. His particular assignment was at Range, Colo-
rado, where he and one Lyle Nichols were cleaning a 
rock slide. Nichols was. operating a Huff Loader and 
plaintiff was located at a telephone where he would re-
ceive reports from the dispatcher as to any expected 
movement along the track (R. 17). That morning Assist-
ant Roadmaster Summerfield gave instructions to 
Nichols and p'laint1ff to load the Huff Loader and a 
Huff Loader wheel and tire, which was behind the tool 
house at Range, Colorado, onto a flatcar and to have 
this task done by 3 :00 to 3 :30 p.m. ( R. 20). 
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·The Huff Loader wheel and tire weighed approxi-
niately 450 pounds (R. 24). 
Nichols and p~laintiff rolled the wheel and tire from 
behind the tooi house up along the track to where there 
was a slope of ap·pro\Ximately 18 inches to a foot from the 
ends of the ties to the ground (R. 21). They rolled the 
wheel and tire upright onto the outer teeth of the Huff 
Loader bucket. Plaintiff took a posit'ion in front of the 
tire holding it up~right with his hands, and Nichols mount-
ed the Huff Loader for the purpose of lifting the bucket. 
The bucket lifted on an arc and a point would be reached 
where the wheel and tire woul:d lay back against the end 
of the bucket without h~aving to be manually held in that 
p1o:sition (R. 25-27). As the tire was being lifted Nichols 
allowed the Huff Loader to suddenly and unexpectedly 
back away from plaintiff, causing the tire and wheel to 
fall out of the bucke~t. In trying to prevent the tire and 
wheel from falling, plaintiff was caused to suffer a se-
vere straining injury (R. 31, 32). At that time plaintiff 
complained to Nichols that he had ''jerked a kink in my 
back" (R. 32). The two men thereafter roiled the tire 
and wheel into app~roximately the same position in the 
bucket and on the roadbed. Nichols again lifted the 
bucket but this time did not allow the Huff Loader to 
back away from where plaintiff was holding the tire and 
whe·el in position an!d the lifting of the tire and wheel 
was accomplished without incident. After the tire had 
been lifted high enough so that it laid back against the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
bucket, Nichols proceeded across the tracks to where the 
flatcar was located and lowered the Huff Loader tire and 
wheel onto the flatcar (R. 32, 33). 
During this time plaintiff continued to experience 
pain in his back (R. 34). When the other members of the 
crew arrived he complained to Ernest E·. Foster, the 
Assistant F·oreman, that he had injured his ba:ck (R .. 34). 
At the end of the shift plaintiff drove his automoibile 
home. That evening he finished his chores but his hack 
continued to give him such trouble that he was "up and 
down all night" (R. 35). 
The next work day plaintiff again reported for work 
at Range, C·olorado. The condition of his back had re-
mained about the same (R. 36). 
The second work day following his injury he made 
a report to George Collett, the foreman of the crew, and 
received a slip to be examined by Dr. Thomas N. Sims 
at Eagle, Colorado (R. 36, 37). Thereafter he received 
treatments from Dr. Sims on several occasions. Follow-
ing these treatments the pain in his back would seem to 
ease up temporarily (R. 38). 
Dr. Sims testified that he saw plaintiff on August 
24, 1951, plaintiff told him that he had injured his back 
"while attempting to tip a tire into a Huff Loader" and 
the doctor found a "lesion" or "deviation from the nor-
mal" of the right hip (R. 224, 225). 
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For a period of four to six weeks following his injury 
plaintiff's back continued hurting him and he would 
''·work a day or two and have· to lay off" (R. 37). There-
after, because of the condition of his back, it was neces-
sary for him to lay off work altogether (R. 38). F'ollow-
ing his injuries he earned a total sum from the railroad 
of between $100.00 and $150.00 (R. 38) . 
. He continued to exp~erience extensive pain In his 
hack, and in January of 195·2 he went to Glenwood 
Springs to see Dr. Livingston. Dr. Livingston gave him 
some pills and told him he was not to lift over five or 
ten pounds for a year (R. 38, 39). For a time plaintiff 
tried, with the assistance of his wife, to take care of his 
sheep. He then sent them with another herd to the 
desert (R. 39'). He was later obliged to sell them in July 
of 1953 (R. 40). 
In February or M·arch of 1952 he sought assistance 
from Dr. Nutting at Glenwood Springs, Colorado (R. 40). 
Thereafter in March of 1952 he was sent by the railroad 
company to see Dr. Hines at D·enver, Colorado. Dr. 
I-Iines in turn had him examined by Dr. Ellis, an ortho-
pedic s-urgeon at Denver, Colorado. Dr. Ellis prescribed 
the use of a canvas belt with heavy stays ('R .. 42). Dur-
ing this time plaintiff experienced extreme difficulty with 
his back. He testified (R. 42) : 
"Q. W'hat kind of difficulty~ 
A. Well, I couldn't get out of bed in the morning 
I felt like my legs were asleep, and if I hap: 
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pened to turn over on my stomach in the 
night, I couldn't hardly get turned back over. 
Q. How do you sleep nights~ 
A. I finally took to sleeping on the floor on the 
rug in the front room, where I could sleep. 
Q. Did you have a blanket over you~ 
A. I had a sleeping bag; slept on the floor in a 
sleeping bag. 
Q. Were you able to sleep well nights~ 
A. No, I never have slept very well for the last 
two years." 
A month after he had seen Dr. Ellis, he again went 
to Dr. Ellis' office and saw another doctor. Thereafter 
he was sent to Salida, Colorado where he was examined 
by Dr. Hoover, an orthopedic surgeon, and by Dr. F'uller 
(R. 43). He continued to wear the canvas belt support 
and to take hot baths (R. 43). In connection with his 
wearing of the belt he testified that hy the time of 
trial he had "nearly worn it out" (R. 156). On his own 
initiative plaintiff sought medical assistance from a Dr. 
Newman, another orthopedic surgeon, at Denver, Colo-
rado. He likewise sought assistance from a Dr. Grant 
Young, an orthopedist from Denver, Colorado (R. 44). 
In the Fall of 1951 plaintiff "\vent hunting at Red-
wood, a!bout eight miles from his home. On this hunting 
trip he experienced considerable difficulty with his back 
( R. 45). On one occasion in the year 1952 he at-
tended a Roping Club, to which he had belonged for a 
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number of years. He caught one calf but the effort 
bothere·d his back and he never again attempted to per-
form any roping (R. 45, 46). In 195·2 he went on an elk 
hunt. lie had been unable to earn a living for some time 
and needed the meat to aid in supporting his family (R. 
46). 
F'rom July to October, 1952 he worked stacking hay 
to repay an indebtedness on his sheep (R. 47). The work 
bothered his back considerably. In March and April of 
1953 he drove truck for one Vern Davis, at Green River, 
U ta'h, and earned approximately $400.00 (R. 48). He wa·s 
forced to quit because of the condition of his back (R. 
48, 126). 
In May, June and July of 1953 he worked for C'ater 
Construction Company and earned approximately 
$500.00. The Cater Construction Company terminated 
his employment because he was unable to work steady. 
This job required him to do some shoveling and bending 
over and his hack would not hold up under this typ·e of 
work (R. 48, 130). 
He was next employed by Deardon Lumber Company 
at Burns, Colorado from the 1st of July, 1953 until the 
lOth of March, 1954, but was unable to work steady be-
cause of his back condition. This work involved rolling 
logs down a ramp with a cant hook and other forms of 
physical a:ctivity. During an ordinary work week he 
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would work two or three days and lay off a few days 
(R. 49, 150). He described the effect on him of this 
type work as follows (R. 50, 51): 
"A. Well it seemed like my legs in the morning 
-I could not get them to working for me, 
whenever I would get up. 
Q. How did your legs feel; can you describe it 
for us~ 
A. The bottom of my foot would get numb. 
Q. Which foot~ 
A. And my leg down to my knee· was numb. 
Q. Was it one leg more than another, or both 
legs~ 
A. Well, it seems like it was in my right leg 
mostly, but it would switch once in a while 
to my left leg. My left leg never bothered me 
quite as much as my right leg. 
Q. Was there a particular place or location in 
your back, where you suffered from pain~ 
A. No, always hurt; not bad, but always there; 
just pains. 
Q. Did you have any particular incident while 
working for Deardon Lumber Company 1n 
which you had spe'Cial difficulties~ 
A. I passed out, I think, about three times.. 
Q. F:rom what type of exertion~ 
A. I was trying to turn a log once, and lifting, 
and I passed out. The other two times I was 
taking chains off the saw, and I passed out 
when I went to push one down the runway 
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once. The other time I was-. had just brought 
a heavy one over, and I leaned up· against the 
pole until I got squared away. 
Q. Did you cut yourself on one occasion~ 
A. ·My legs give way on me once, and I cut my 
hands. I slipped back against it. 
Q. Do you have the scars you can show us~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Will you step down and show the jury the 
scars~ 
('Witness exhibiting scar to jury)" 
During this eight month period of time he earned 
ap~proximately $1000.00. If he had worked steady he 
would have earned between $2000.00 and $2400.00 (R. 52). 
His next employment was in May of 1954 with 
Decker Trucking Company, Green River, Utah, as an 
oil truck driver. Up· to the time of trial he had earned 
approximately $390.00 but testified that he was having 
extreme diffi'Culty with his back on this job. He stated 
(R. 53) : 
''A. Well, a week ago, I did not think I could stand 
it very much longer, but the truck broke 
·down. I have had a week's rest. I think I can 
maybe take it for a few weeks m.ore." 
In connection with motion pictures mentioned by ap-
pellant in its. brief that were surreptitiously taken of the 
plaintiff whi[e working at the Deardon Lumber Company 
he testifield (R. 151, 152) : 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
"Q. S·o that, the things you were doing in that 
picture were not bona fide, and didn't actually 
show you doing things you ordinarily do, 
then~ 
A. Not as I ordinarily do, no. 
Q. Well, in what respect were you not doing the 
things as you ordinarily do~ 
A. We were more or less putting on for these 
pictures. They were supposed to be educa-
tional pictures, and I was to get a percentage 
of what they were s.o[d for; I was tricked into 
that, from a boy that was supposed to be from 
Hollywood, that came from Grand J'unction, 
at the request of the railroad, to take these 
pictures." 
At the time the pictures were taken Moore was wear-
ing the canvas belt (R. 166). 
Dr. Reed Smoot Clegg, an orthopedic surgeon, testi-
fied that he examined plaintiff on January 30, 1953 (R. 
59, 60), and March 2, 1954 (R. 61). Plaintiff gave a his-
tory of injury to his lower spine. Dr. Clegg found muscle 
spasm of the involuntary objective type in the lumbo 
sacral spine (R. 60, 61). Dr. Clegg also testified (R .. 61): 
"A. There was a slight sensory loss, or sensory 
dimunition on the latera~ side, or outside of 
the inner or medial side of the right foot. 
Q. What does that indicate, please, doctor~ 
A. This represents irritation of nerves which 
com.e out of the lower sp,in,e, and extend into 
the legs. 
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Q. Could you tell us what was causing that ir-
ritation~ 
A. I had my-
Q. Do you have an opinion~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Will you give us. your opinion~ 
A. I f~lt, with the other findings such as limit-
ation of straight leg raising, and limitation 
of forward flexion, in an attempt to touch 
the floor without bending the knees, and with 
the very slight variation, slight x-ray changes 
that were present, and followilng the subs,e-
quent examination on the 2nd· of March, 1954, 
it was my opinion that Mr. Moore had irrita-
tion of the. nerves of the lower spine, which 
radiate into both legs, especially on the left 
side." 
T1he x-rays, to which the doctor referred, were "es-
sentially normal except for very slight narrowing of the 
lumb~o s:a:cral joint'' (R. 62,. 63). The doctor was asked 
a hypothetical question and gave answers as follows (R. 
63-67) : 
"Q. Doctor, assuming this man was injured on 
August 9, 1951, an·d he was in the p~rocess of 
loading a big heavy tire, weighing anywhere 
from 3 to 5 hundred pounds, on to a sort of a 
shovel, that came down and caught much of 
ihe w·eight in his arms, causing him to lean 
over to the s~ide, and he felt a sharp pain in his 
back, assuming that he had not had any 
trouble with his back before that time, assum-
ing these things., and what you found on your 
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examination, would you have an opinion as to 
whether this condition you found in his ba:ck, 
was caused by the accident which I referred 
to~ 
A. I do. 
Q. What is your opinion~ 
A. All I could say is that it is possible that the· 
accident could either initiate it or -" 
After objection of counsel and discussion with the 
Court the witness was allowed to explain his previous 
answer and particularly the use of the word "possible" 
as fo[lows (R. 64): 
"A. In medicine, we cannot come out definitely 
on things, very often and say absolutely defi-
nitely that such-and-such a condition is so-
and-so, but we usually qualify our diagnosis, 
because sometimes we get fooled, and we use 
the word 'possible' and that is all I can state. 
I cannot say definitely that this is probably 
or definitely that it is. It is just a possible 
condition; that was my opinion. 
* * * * 
Q. Now do you have an opinion as to what is 
causing this nerve irritation as you describe 
"t OJ 1 . 
A. I do. 
Q. Will you give us your opinion on that~ 
A. Again it is a p·ossibility. It is my opinion 
that this is possibly due to pressure on the 
nerve in the lower spine, due to irritation 
from a disc. 
* * * * 
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Q. {Mr. Roberts) Now I am won·dering, Doctor, 
if you could step down here to the Board and 
make a little ·diagram or drawing of what this. 
disc thing is, so that we can get some kind of 
a picture of it. Make the lines definite, please, 
they are a little hard to see on that Board. 
* * * * 
A. '* * * Between these vertebra is a cushion, or 
a disc, as it is called, which is gristle, or car-
tilage ma,terial, and its actual function is as a 
shock absorber. Sometimes this cushion pinch-
es ag1ainst t:he nerve going down the leg, and 
that is a P'ossibility of what has occurred in 
this case, t.hat the disc has cause:d the irrita-
tion of the nerve, and charaC'teristically this 
condition has exacerbations ·arnd remissioVJVS. 
You .have at~acks of pam and it heals up. 
From the knowledge that I can gather from 
hearsay, from the physical findings, I felt 
that irritation of the nerve 1nay very well be 
from this disc p·ressing against the nerve; as 
I brought out, that irritatiotn, possibly the 
disc, has removed suffiqiently the pressure, 
·and it has been imp·roved. 
Q. From your examinati-on of this man, X-rays-
do you have .an opitn.ion as to whether or not 
he has Otny p-er·manent disability as a 'result 
of this condition iln his back? 
A. I do. 
Q. What is your opinion of it, doctor? 
A. It is my opinion that he has a 5% disability-
permanent disability. 
* * * * 
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Q. Do you have an opinion as to whether or not 
there will be this continued, what you call 
irritation~ 
A. The exacerbation, remission. 
Q. What does that mean~ 
A. That means the condition gets worse, perhaps 
the disc irritates over a period of time, and 
he ha~ p~in, and then it clears up, and he has 
a remission. 
Q. Do you have an opinion as to whether that 
will continue on through life~ 
A. I do. 
Q. What is your opinion~ 
A. I base the fact that this. possibility to have 
subsequent attacks, subsequent exacerbations 
and remissions, as forming part of the reason 
for giving him the 5% permanent disability." 
In connection with disc injuries generally he testi-
fied on redirect examination as follows (R. 81) : 
''Q. Your disc injury is caused more by wh!at 
type of thing, than would be the fracture of 
the back~ 
A. The disc injury represents a soft tissue be-
tween the fractures; it occurs usually where 
there has been no fracture or break in the 
bone, but when there has been disease or in-
jury or strain of the soft tissues, and not 
sufficient to break the bone but to tear or 
strain the soft tissues. 
Q. In connection with your findings here on the 
x-rays, whi0h you have indicated, and also on 
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the pattern of the pa1n, and the sensory 
change which you found, are all of those 
things consistent~ 
A. Yes." 
In connection with plaintiff's condition he testifie'd 
(R. 76): 
''Q. Now these conditions, do they tend to correct 
themselves, doctor, where the ~onditions are 
not serious~ 
A. They are charact.eristically intermittent and 
fleetifn.g, they come and go, and we cannot 
always prescribe just what the future will 
bring." 
STATEMENT OF· POINT·s. 
POINT' I. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GIVE 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRU·CTION NO. 16. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 12. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN GIVING INSTRU·CTION NO. 13. 
POINT IV. 
THE JURY'S VERDICT WAS NOT SO EXCESSIVE AS 
TO INDICATE THAT IT WAS DICTATED BY PASSION OR 
PREJUDICE. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GIVE 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 16. 
Defendant starts out with the proposition that it 
was the burden of plaintiff to prove damages with "rea-
sonable certainty." Some courts require plaintiff to 
establish damages with that degree of proof. Utah has 
expressly repudiated that rule and permits plaintiff to~ .. 
cover such damages as he ma.y "I)robably" suffer. 
In Picino v. Utah-Apex Mining Co., 52 Utah 338, 173 
Pac. 900, the jury was instructed that plaintiff could 
recover for physical pain and mental anguish he would 
probably endure in the future, and for the earnings he 
would probably lose in the future. This instruction was 
held correct and the Court stated (p. 902): 
"In support of this assignment appellants 
concede that damages may be allowed in cases of 
this kind for future pain and suffering and for 
future loss of time; but they insist that the jury 
should be limited in awarding the damages for 
such future pain and suffering or loss of time as 
is reasonably certain from the evidence the plain-
tiff will suffer in the future. They object to the 
jury speculating as to the pain and suffering he 
will probably hereafter endure and the time he 
will probably hereafter lose." 
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In referring to cases cited by the defendant in sup-
port of its contention that damages should be proved to 
a reasonable ~certainty the 'Court stated (p. 902) : 
"Some of these authorities apparently sup'"' 
p~ort app·ellants' contention, while others are clear-
ly distinguished from the p-resent case. We think 
there is a clear distinction between that which 
'may happen' and that which 'will proba;bly hap-
pen.' The former may imply a mere possibility, 
while the latter implies that which is likely to 
·happen. This distinction, in effect, is recognized 
by many of the authorities. The rule invoked by 
appellants calls for a higher degree of certainty 
than is ordinarily required in civil cases. It is 
quite true the jury should n~ot be permitted to in-
dulge in mere speculation in endeavoring to deter-
mine the rights of litigants. It do:es not follow, 
however, that because they cannot demo'YIJStrate 
their conclusions with mathematical p·re:cision that 
therefore their conclwsions are invalid. Even in 
attempting to determine the damages. already sus-
tained in cases of this kind, jurors, in the very 
nature of things, are confronted with more or less 
uncertainty. That which is most likely, or that 
which is prohabie in the light of all the evidence, 
is oftentimes the only practical guide. If a higher 
degree of certainty than this is required, it is 
manifest that great hards~hip and injustice will re-
sult in many cases. Of course, the probability here 
referred to should not he a mere conjectural prob-
ability, but one based on evidence. The jury, 
whose duty it is to ascertain and declare the truth 
from ·conflicting testimony, should accept that 
which is probably true as against that which is 
less probable. In doing so the juror keeps with-
in the law ap·plicable to civil cases. He should ac-
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cep1t that which he believes to be t.rue, notwith-
standing it may be more or less uncertailn." 
The Court also stated (p. 902) : 
"* * * After all, it is merely a question of 
belief, founded on substantial evidence, and not 
on conj eeture. That, it seems to us, is all that 
should be required." 
After referring to cases cited by plaintiff the Court 
conclude'd (p. 902) : 
"These authorities sustain the position of 
respondent. The doctrine they enunciate is in 
harmony with our own views and with the prac-
tice generally which prevails in the trial of civil 
cases. If jurors are made to understand that 
their conclusions must be based upon substantial 
evidence actual~y introduced (and they generally 
are so instructed), we see no reason why a dis-
tinction should be made as to the degree of certain-
ty between a case of this kind and any other ordi-
nary civi~l case. Appellant's exception to the in-
struction is not sustained." 
This case was followed in Kirchqestn.er v. Denver 
& R. G. W. R. Co., 118 Utah 20, 218 P. 2d 685. The Court 
stated ( p. 693) : 
"There was no error in instructing the jury 
that the plaintiff was entitled to recover for all 
pain and suffering that he 'will probably endure' 
in the future. The defendant's contention that 
the jury should have been instructed that the 
plaintiff was entitled to recover damages for only 
such future pain and suffering as the evidence 
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establishes with 'reas-onabie certainty' was re-
jected by this court in Picino V'. Utah A.p,ex Min-
ing Co. et al., 52 Utah 338, 173 P. 900, 902. There 
this court approved an instruction allowing the 
jury in assessing damages to consider the physi-
cal and mental pain and suffering which the p~lain­
tiff 'will probably hereafter endure.' " 
T'here is no question that expert testimony may 
be introduced that certain acts coul~d he or might be the 
cause of a physical condition. In Jackson v. Harries, 
65 Utah 282, 236 Pac. 234, the doctor testified as follows 
(p. 237) : 
"* * * 'I don't know horw long such a condi-
tion as I find in Mrs. Jackson might exist. It 
might be for a short while fo~lowed by recovery; 
or it might be pr·olonged over many years. This 
is something that time alone will tell. A person 
under these conditions suffers pain -may suffer 
pain, and there is very much mental distress.' 
* * *" . 
He also testified that Mrs. J aekson's inability to 
perform household labor, etc., "woul'd follow, or might 
follow, as a result of the condition which I have des-
cribed." Another doct~or was asked whether or not the 
conditions he found in Mrs. Jackson could have .been 
caused by the actions of the officers, and he answered 
(p. 237) : 
,, '* * * 'I believe it could. I believe that shock 
of sufficient nature could cause all these symp-
toms that you have spoken of and the hysterical 
manifestations that I found upon her examina-
tion.' " 
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Defendants ma:de proper objections to the foregoing 
testimony and the objections were overruled. In explan-
ing defendants' position the Court stated (p. 237) : 
"The objection is that they call for testimony 
which is immaterial and inc-ompetent. The argu-
ment is made that the experts are called because 
they are supposed to be competent to express an 
opinion, having probative value, as to the real 
cause of the plaintiff's condition; and that, to 
support the charge that defendants are responsi-
ble for that condition, the expert opinion should 
be addressed to the conclusion as to whether or 
not defendants' acts were the cause thereof. If 
the expert could not say that in his opinion the 
acts complained of did or did not cause the injury, 
then his testimony was without value, being mere 
speculation and conjecture, and affording no basis 
for an award of damages." 
The Court then stated (p. 237) : 
"But the overwhelming weight of authority 
is against appellants' position upon this point, 
and is in support of the rule that it is proper to put 
such questions in the form used in this case, so 
as to obt~ain the opinion of the expert witness as 
to w·hether or not the: !acts assumed could be or 
might be the cause of the condition descr·ibed, 
and leavilng it to the jury to say whether or not 
they were in fact the cause thereof. These cases, 
it seems to us, are supported by the better rea-
son." 
The Court concluded (p. 238) : 
''There was no error in the c·ourt overruling 
the objections to the questions above mentioned 
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p·ropounded to the me·dical experts. For them to 
give the opinion that the condition of the plain-
tiff as describe'd and assumed in the questions 
could or might be the result of the assumed cause 
establishes a fact, if their testimony be credited 
by the jury, from which the latter might, when 
considering it in connection with all the other evi-
·dence in the case hearing upon the point, conclude 
that the assumed cause was the real cause of the 
injury." 
By its requested Instruction N·o. 16 defendant asked 
that the jury ·be instructed to the effect that no c-ompe-
tent evidenee had been received upon which a finding 
could be made that plaintiff sustained a ruptured inter-
vertebral disc an'd therefore they should disregard any 
contention made by plaintiff that he sustained a disc 
InJury 
Under the evidence introduced in this case the fact 
that plaintiff may have suffered a ruptured interverte-
bral disc cannot be eliminated from the case·. Every 
symptom and circumstance was consistent with the exist-
ence of a ruptured disc (R. 81). By this instruction de-
fendant sought to eliminate any consideration of this 
testimony which defendant concedes was prop·erly ad-
mitted in evidence. 
The Court, in its Instruction No. 25 (R. 315), set 
forth the ele1nents to be considered by the jury in com-
puting damages, and a ruptured intervertebral disc was 
n·ot mentioned. The elements set forth upon which dam-
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ages could be returned were for pain and suffering, both 
mental and physical, past and future; loss of bodily func-
tion, past and future; lost earnings, and impairment of 
earning capacity. 
The evidence established that Dr. ·Clegg was of the 
opinion that the condition from which plaintiff suffered 
was an irritation of the nerves which come out of the 
lower spine and extend into the legs. 
After testifying to the existence of an involuntary 
muscle spasm in the muscles of p~laintiff's back the doc-
tor testified as follows (R. 61) : 
"Q. Go ahead and tell us what you found. 
A. There was slight sensory loss, or sensory 
dimunition on the lateral side, or outside of 
the inner or medial side of the right foot. 
Q. What does that indicate, please, Doctor~ 
A. This represents irritation of nerves which 
come out of the lower spine, and extend into 
the legs. 
* * * * 
Q. Do you have an opinion~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Will you give us your opinion~ 
A. I felt, with the other findings such as limita-
tion of straight leg raising, and limitation of 
forward flexion, in an attempt to touch the 
floor without bending the knees, and with 
the very slight variation, slight x-ray changes 
that were present, and following the subse-
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quent examination on the 2nd of March, 1954, 
it was my opinion that Mr. Moore had irri-
tation of the nerves of the lower spine, which 
radiate into both legs, especially on the left 
side." 
F·rom this testimony there can be no question that 
the jury could find that the plaintiff was suffering from 
this nerve irritation. The testimony of p~laintiff confirms 
this nerve injury (R. 50). 
T'he next p~roposit~on would be to determine whether 
or not there wa.s a causal relationship between the falling 
of the wheel onto plaintiff and this irritation of the 
nerves. Dr. Clegg testified concerning the relationship 
'between the falling of the wheel and the condition he 
found in plaintiff's back. He testifie·d (R. 63): 
"A. All I could say is that it is possible that the 
accident could either initiate it or-" 
An objection was ma:de to the use of the word "pos-
sible" and the doctor then explained what he meant by 
this term as follows (R. 64): 
''A. In medicine, we cannot come out definitely 
on things, very often and say absolutely de-
finitely that such-and-such a condition is so-
and-so, but we usually qualify our diagnosis, 
because sometimes we get fooled, and we use 
the word 'possible' and that is all I can state. 
I cannot say definitely that this is probably 
or definitely that it is. It is just a possible 
condition; that was my opinion." 
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On cross examination he further made explanation 
of his use of this term as follows (R. 73) : 
"Q. And your diagnosis is such a possibility, 
doctor, of course, as you have indicated, from 
the history and also the findings you also 
made in your office, that is right, isn't it~ 
A. Yes, it is still a possibility; you cannot say 
absolutely and definitely." 
When asked to give his opinion on what was causing 
this nerve irritation he answered (R. 65) : 
"A. Again it is possibility. It is my opinion that 
this is possibly due to pressure on the nerve 
in the lower spine, due to irritation from a 
disc." 
He also testified (R. 66) : 
"* * * I felt that irritation of the nerve may 
very well be from this disc pressing against the 
nerve; as I brought ·out, that irritation, possibly 
the disc, has removed sufficiently the pressure, 
and it has been improved." 
On cross examination Dr. Clegg testified that in 
passing him physically for work as a prison guard he 
would pass him if his employers would accept the fact 
that he would be slightly handicapped and occasionally 
would have attacks when he w·ould be fairly handicapped 
(R. 76). I-Ie stated that the condition of plaintiff was 
"characteristically intermittent and fleeting, they come 
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and go, and we cannot always prescribe just what the 
future will bring." Concerning the disc he testifie·d (R. 
81): 
"Q. In connection with your findings here on 
the X-rays, which you have indicated, and also 
on the p·attern of the pain, an~d the sensory 
change which you found, are all of those 
things consistent~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you have an op·inion as to whether or not 
they are consistent with a ruptured disc~ 
A. Yes, I feel consistent." 
When we consideT the foregoing testimony with the 
testimony of plaintiff that his back had never been in-
jure-d before and that he had never had a lame or sore 
back, or ever h·ad any treatment for it (R. 16), together 
with his testimony that from the time the wheel fell onto 
his arm, he experienced pain in his back which was con-
tinuous and had never left him from that time until the 
time of the trial, we have un~der the cases sufficient evi-
dence to establish the causal relation between the falling 
of the whee[ an'd the injuries to plaintiff. 
(a) There was sufficient evidence of the existence 
of a d.isc injury to g-o to the jury. 
As pointed out a1bove, the ultimate injury which 
p·laintiff suffered from the fall of the wheel was the 
irritation to the nerves at the lower back. The specific 
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condition causing this nerve injury was really immaterial 
if the injury was caused by the dropping of the wheel 
on plaintiff. 
l:q referring to the disc injury the doctor was merely 
referring to the condition which might he causing the 
nerve root irritation. ~,he testimony of the doctor shows 
that he was not using the word "possible" as a lay per-
son or lawyer would ordinarily use it. He expressly 
stated that inasmuch as he could not definitely and possi-
tively state that a -certain condition existed he of neces-
sity had to revert to the use of "possible." He also ex-
pressly stated that all of the symptoms were consistent 
with the existence of the disc. No other cause for this 
nerve irritation was suggested. 
In Sharp v. Esso Sta;ndard Oil Co., (La.), 72 So. 2d 
601, the court expressed the modern view in weighing 
medical testimony when the medical expert uses words 
such as ''possible," "probable," "could," "might," and 
the like. The court held that it should not try to draw 
a distinction between the doctor's choice of "possible" 
as against "probable," but should apply a common sense 
viewpoint to the testimony as a whole. That case was 
a suit for workmen's compensation for death. The de-
cedent was an assistant operator in a refining company 
and on N ove1nber 13, 1950 left the control room to open 
a valve. No other employee was with him at the time. 
He apparently opened the valve and was then unable 
to close it. He called for assistance. The tower ulti-
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mately had to be shut down so the va~lve could he closed. 
The incident caused decedent some excitem.ent. He had 
a cyanotic ap,pearance according to his co-employees. 
IThe next incident occurred December 13, 1950 when 
dece1dent walked into the eontrol room almost out of 
breath, complaining of pain in his chest, exhibiting a 
cyanotic app·earance, and collapsed. He was taken to a 
hospital and later sent home. His family physician dis-
covered he had suffered a he-art attack and he was re-
turned to the hospital and treated. until January 14, 1951. 
H·e was unable to work until his death, October 19, 1951. 
The questions presented were whether or not the accrdent 
experienced by decedent, November 13, 1950, followed 
by the heart attack of Decem~ber 13, 1950 had any causal 
connection with the disability occurring during his em-
ployment with defendant and if it was a cause of the 
heart attack suffered by dece'dent October 19, 1951. The 
doctor testified as foJlows : 
"Q. Then you are saying that such an occasion, 
under the circumstan·ce as I have related to 
you, could bring about an injury to the heart 
and he bad on it~ Is that right, sir~ 
A. That's within the reahn of possibility. Yes, 
I think it is within the realm of possibility. 
* * * * 
Q. And a thrombosis of that nature (non-symp-
tomatic) could have occurred on November 13, 
t9·50~ 
A. Oh, yes, it is within the realm of possibility. 
I don't believe it did from the evidence sub-
mitted." 
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The Court stated: 
"We know medical science knows more about 
these things than we do, and our experience ha.s 
been, from hearing testimony of this kind, that 
when a doctor says possible or probable, he does 
not mean that it did not happen as contended in 
the sense that an ordinary layman would under-
stand his words. In giving their testimony, all 
medical experts try to give guarded testimony, 
and some courts try to draw a distinction between 
possibilities and proba:bilities. To our way of 
thinking and to the modern trend of the courts 
in considering these terms, we should look at 
them in a common-sense way." 
The Court quoted 2 La.rson, W orlunen's Compensa-
tion Law, p. 322, as follows: 
'' 'The distinction between probability and 
possibility should not follow too slavishly the 
witnesses' choice of words, as sometimes happens 
in respect to medical testimony. A doctor's use 
of such words as 'might,' 'could,' 'likely,' 'possible' 
and 'may have', coupled with other credible evi-
dence of a non-medical character, such as a se-
quence of symptoms or events corroborating the 
opinion, is sufficient to sustain an award. It is 
a common experience of compensation and per-
sonal injury law-yers to find that the more dis-
tinguished a medical witness is the more tentative 
and qualified are his statements on the witness 
stand. He will testify that the sledge-hammer 
blow on claimant's head might have caused claim-
ant's headache, but hesitates to say positively that 
this was the only possible cause, and may concede 
on cross-examination that there could conceiv-
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ably he other causes. The weight of such testi-
mony, however, should not be too sharply dis-
counted because of the disposition of the highly-
trained scientific mind to refrain from unqualified 
statements or opinions on such matters as causa-
tion.' " 
'The Supreme C·ourt of the United States in Laven-
der v. Kurn, 327 U. S-. 645, 653, 66 S .. Ct. 740, 90 L. Ed. 
916, recognized that some speeulation is necessary in all 
situations where evidence must ·be considered. That 
Court stated : 
"It is no answer to say that the jury's verdict 
involved speculation and conjecture. Whenever 
facts are in disp-ute or the .evidence is such that 
fairminded men may draw different inferences, 
a measure of sp•eculation and conjecture is re-
quire-d on the part of those whose duty it is to 
settle the disp·ute by choosing what seems to them 
to be the. most reasonable inference." 
Our Court has recognized this same situation and 
we specifically refer to the italicized portions of the 
quotations from the Picino and Jackson cases, supra. 
It is unnece'ssary for a doctor to state with mathematical 
certainty the existence of a condition in order to find 
that it existed. As was stated in Utah Fuel Co. v. In-
dustrial Commission, 102 Utah 26, 126 P. 2d 1070, "Even 
doctors have no television of the pathological history 
of the insi'de of a man." From all the doctor could deter-
mine the symptoms of a disc were present when he con-
sidered the entire pricture, but inasmuch as he coul'd be 
wrong he used the term "possibility." A common sense 
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interpretation of his testimony leads to the conclusion 
that the most probable thing which was causing the nerve 
root irritation was a ruptured disc. 
We submit that the evidence was sufficient to justi-
fy the court in refusing to eliminate all consideration of 
what might be causing the nerve irritation which was 
the important condition. Whether or not the disc was 
causing the nerve irritation would not eliminate the fact 
that the nerve irritation could be found to be present 
un'der Dr. Clegg's testimony above quoted. 
('b) The evidence Wias sufficient to sho·w .a causal 
connection betwe.en the falling of the wheel on plaintiff 
a.nd the itnjuries he suffered and from which he con--
tinued to suffer 1J!Jttil the time of trial. 
The medical testimony was not the only testimony 
introduced concerning the causal connection between 
plaintiff's injury and the falling of the wheel. Plaintiff 
testified that on August 9, 1951 he was engaged in load-
ing a wheel, weighing from 400 to 500 pounds, onto a 
Huff Loader (R. 24). Immediately upon the wheel fal-
ling upon him he felt pain in his back (R .. 31) and from 
that time until the time of trial his back continued to hurt 
him. His back hurt him the rest of the day (R. 34) and 
was still hurti'njg him when he got home. fie couldn't sleep 
very well that night (R. 35), and on the next work day 
his back continued to hurt him (R. 36). F'or the next 
four to six weeks he worked a day or two and then would 
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have to lay ·off on account of his back (R. 37). His back 
bothered him in every activity which he pursue'd (R. 45, 
47-49). It was hard for him to get his legs going in the 
morning; the bottom of his foot would get numb; his leg 
to his knee was numb. This condition was mostly in his 
right leg, but sometimes would switch to his. left leg. 
I-Iis back pained continuously (R. 50). 
Under the Utah cases a finding that the back nerve 
irritation was caused by the falling of a wheel was sup-
ported by the foregoing evidence. 
In Ut.ah Fuel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 102 Utah 
26, 126 P. 2'd 1070, the deceased, while in the course of 
his employment, slip,p·ed from a saw horse causing him 
to fall and strike his right testicle on the hiar he was 
using or on a piece of coal. The fall caused a contusion 
on his right testicle. Deceased continued to work from 
January 3, 19'41, the date on which he fell, to January 
14, 1941, when the pain became so severe he was forced 
to stop work. He was sent to the hospital February 1, 
1941 and died May 3, 19·41. An autopsy was performed 
and the cause of death was diagnosed as "primary car-
cinoma of right testicle with carcinomatosis." An award 
for his window an·d children was affirmed. The Court 
stated ('p·. 29) : 
"·As the commission in'dicated in its findings, 
the deceased was probably suffering from car-
cinoma at the time of the trau1na.. Dr. Ogilvie's 
testimony establishes the cause of the death of the 
deceased as 'primary carcinoma of the right tes-
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ticle with carcinomatosis,' but as to the question 
of the injury accelerating the pre-existing can-
cerous condition, the doctor refused to speculate, 
stating that 'sometimes trauma greatly accele-
rates the growth of cancer but sometimes it does 
not.' The medical profession has been unable 
definitely to determine the cause and cure of 
cancer. The profession is hesitant to make any 
positive statements concerning it. We have here 
a situation in which the deceased received an in-
jury to his right testicle. Swelling and pain im-
mediately developed which became progressively 
worse, ending with the death of the deceased. The 
circumstantial evidence indicates that the injury 
aggravated and accelerated the cancerous condi-
tion contributing to the death of the deceased. 
This is the more probable and rational explana-
tion of the factors leading up to the death of the 
deceased." 
The Court also stated (p. 30): 
"* * * In this case there is no medical evi-
dence on the question of whether the effect of the 
blow accelerated the pre-existing condition; the 
doctors refusing to spectula te (sic) but the Com-
mission drew the 'inference that there was a 
definite connection between the blow and the 
acceleration of the condition, because apparently 
the acceleration did 'begin with that event." 
The Court also stated (p. 30) : 
"* * * The physicians testified that the ac-
cident could or might have had that effect. We 
do not think it is necessary for an applicant to 
procure a doctor who will make a positive state-
ment where it is obvious that no positive state-
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ment could be expected. Even d·octors have no 
television of the p~athological history of the in-
side of a man. When the event of accident is 
definite and injures a particular member or 
part of the body and afterward disability or 
death occurs and the progression toward disa'bility 
or death can definitely be ·ascertained as beginning 
with the form.er event because the history of the 
p-rogression ·directly involves a worsening of 
the member or part to which the injury occurred 
or the evidenee involves a connection between 
the trauma and other affected parts in the history 
of the p-rogressive worsening, there will be sus-
taining evidence for an award." 
In Salt £,ake ·City v. Industrial Com.mission, 104 
Utah 436, 140 P. 2·d 644, medical testimony would not sup-
port a causal relation betwe·en a blow in the eye from a 
handball and sarcoma, which necessitated removal of 
the eye, but. the sequence of events did and an award in 
favor of the workman was sustained. After discussing 
the medical testimony and definitely holding that it would 
not :alone supp·ort the award the Court then starts to 
trace the sequence of events as a result of which it held 
there was sufficient evidence to support a finding of 
causal relationship· 'between the blow and the sarcoma. 
The 'Court stated (p. 444): 
"The sequen·ce of events to which the com-
mission referred were brought out by the testi-
mony of the applicant. According to this testi-
mony he was struck in the eye by a handball in 
October, 1940. At this time he suffered consider-
able pHin, the eye~ball became bloodshot, and the 
area around the eye became discolored. In a:bout 
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two or three weeks these outward signs of the· in-
jury disappe'ared. About a month after the injury 
the eye began to water and mucus would collect 
in the eye. Some six months later the applicant 
had difficulty in reading because his vision would 
blur. This impairment of vision became progress-
ively worse. Within a period of a little over a 
year from the date of the injury, it became neces-
s·ary to remove the eye because of this malignant 
growth." 
'After citing and quoting from the Utah Fuel Com-
pany case, supra, the Court continued (p. 445): 
"The applicant relies on our holding in the 
Utah Fuel case in support of his position here, but 
it is doubtful that this case can on its facts be 
brought within the rule laid down in the Utah 
Fuel ease. The 'bridging symptoms. are not nearly 
so convincing in this ease for after all outward 
signs of the eye injury had disappeared there was 
a period of from one to six months during which 
there was no trace of this injury. Then the eye 
began to water and the vision became impaired 
because ·of this malignant growth which eventually 
caused the loss of the eye. 
"Yet, even though these bridging symptoms 
are not so strong as those involved in the Utah 
Fuel case, they do have certain probative value. 
Here is a rather severe injury to the eye. Within 
six months a malignant growth had developed 
to such an extent that it impaired the applicant's 
vision." 
·Other courts have sustained this same rule. 
In Glen L. Wigton Motor Co. v. Phillips, 163 Okl. 
160, 21 P. 2d 751, an Industrial ·commission award to 
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a workman was affirmed. The testimony wa.s to the 
effect that he was industrially blind. His eyeball was cut 
in three places and failing sight started at that time. 
The court stated (p. 753) : 
., 'The record discloses that Dr. Brown finds 
that the loss of vision of right eye is 66.8, and that 
this loss of vision might 'be attributable to the 
injury. Dr. ·Shelton concludes that there could be 
astigmatism from a traumatic injury. Dr. Hicks 
testified that the loss of Vision might be produced 
by the injury if the attending physician's report 
was correct. There is nothing in this record to 
indicate the attending physician's report was not 
correct. 
"Emphasis has been made in the brief of 
petitioners relative: to the testimony of Dr. Brown 
that the injury received might have caused the 
resulting disability, and that such evidence is con-
jectural, speculative, and not sufficient upon which 
to base an award by the State Industrial Commis-
sion. 
''This court in the case of Magnolia Petrol-
eum Co. v. Snapp·, 149 Okl. 51, '299 P. 137, 138, in 
the third paragraph of the syllabus, said : 'Evi-
dence that an employee's sight in one eye began 
to fail shortly after an injury to the other eye, 
and that the condition might have resulted from 
the injury, is sufficient to support a finding by 
the State Industrial Commission that the injury 
did result therefrom.' In this connection, see, also, 
Indiana Power & Wa.ter ~co. v. Miller, 73 Ind. App. 
521, 127 N.E. 837." 
The law is clear that it is not necessary to have posi-
tive or any expert testimony of the causal relationship 
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between accident and disability. See Schultz v. Pivar, 
370 Pa. 271, 88 A. 2d 74, 31 A.L.R. 2d 1327, wherein a 
pedestrian fell into a manhole and hurt his back. It was 
held that the jury could assess damages for disability 
for a reasonable time in ihe future without medical testi-
mony of the duration or extent of that time. The Court 
said {p. 1333) : 
''But no expert testimony was here needed to 
establish causal relationship between disability 
and accident. Wher,e 'there is such close connec-
tion between the accident and the injury as to 
satisfy a reasonable person as to the cause of the 
injury, the relation between the two is sufficiently 
shown.'" 
We submit there was no prejudicial error in the 
refusal of the eourt to grant plaintiff's requested In-
struction No. 16. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 12. 
The trial court's Instruction No. 12, given at plain-
tiff's request, charged the jury as follows (R. 304) : 
"That at the time of the occurrence involve'd 
in this case plaintiff, Alfred Roger Moore, and 
defendant were mutually engaged in interstate 
commerce. 
"Under such circumstances the statutes of the 
States of Utah a:nJd Colorado covering employers' 
liability and workman's compensation are not ap-
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·plica:ble to this case and p~ain tiff's right to re-
cover, if any he has, is based solely on the ·Statutes 
of the United States covering the liability of com-
mon carriers by railroad to their employees for 
injuries caused while in the course of their em-
ployment." 
There can be no doubt that the above quoted instruc-
tion correctly states the law. 
The S·upreme Court of the United ·States, in the 
case of New York Cen.tral R. Co. v. Winfield, 2·44 U.S. 
147, 37 S. Ct. 546, 547, stated: 
"It is settled that under the commerce clause 
of the Constitution c,ongress may regulate . the 
obligation of common carriers and the rights of 
their employees arising out of injuries sustained 
by the latter where both are engaged in interstate 
commerce; and it also is settled that when Con-
gress acts upon the subject all state laws cover-
ing the same field are necessarily superseded by 
reason of the supremacy of the national authority. 
'Congress acted upon the subject in passing the 
Employers' Liability Act, and the extent to which 
that act covers the field is the point in con tro-
versy. By one side it is said that the act, although 
regulating the liability or obligation of the car-
rier and the right of the employee where the in-
jury results in "\\Thole or in part from negligence 
attributable to the carrier, does not cover injur-
ies occurring· without such negligence, and there-
fore leaves that class of injuries to be dealt with 
by state laws; and by the other side· it is said that 
the act covers both classes of injuries and is ex-
clusive as to both. * * * 
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"In our opinion the latter view is right and 
the other wrong." 
See also Pritt v. West Virginia N. R. Co., 51 ·s.E:. 
2d 105, 6 A.L.R. 2d ·5;62, 576 '(decided Dec. 14, 1948) ( cer-
tiorari denied by United States Supreme 'Court 69 S. Ct. 
891, 336 U.S. 961, 93 L. Ed. 1113), where the West Vir-
ginia Supreme Court of Appeals stated: 
"* * * The C:ongress of the United States 
having power to ·enact the Federal Employers' 
Liability Act, its. terms controlled all employ-
ment in interstate commerce, and our ·State ~Com­
pensation Act could in no way affect the force 
and effect of the FedeTal Act." 
See also to the same effect So~t.th Buffalo Ry. Co. v. 
Ahern, 344 U.S. 367,73 S. ·ct. 340 (decided Jan.19, 19·5:3). 
Instructions similar to Instruction No. 12 have fbeen 
customarily given by the trial courts of this jurisdiction 
for many years. The purpose of the instruction is ob-
vious. Alm·ost every jury panel is composed of men and 
women who are familiar with the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Laws of the state. They are well aware of the fact 
that employees of the various industries within this 
state, who are injured in the course of their employment, 
are able to obtain redress against their employers under 
the Workmen's Compensation Act by resorting to the In-
dustrial Commission. 
As counsel for injured railroad employees we have 
on a number of occasions where an instruction such a.s 
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Instruction No. 12 has not been give~, later been con-
fronted with questions from jurors asking why the em-
ployee has brought a ease before a court and jury when 
he is eligible to receive or ha._s received workmen's com-
pensation. 
Naturally, this ty·p·e of reasoning would he highly 
prejudicial to the railroad employee in view of the fact 
that the law affords him no remedy other than by resort 
under the Federal E:mployers' Liability Act to the courts 
of general jurisdiction. 
A minimmn standard of fair play would seem to de-
mand that an injured workman be protected by court 
instruction from any risk of injustice that may come from 
such misunderstandings as to the law. 
At page 28 of its hrief, ap·peMant suggests that 
State Workmen's ·Compensation laws are a form of insur-
anee, -and that Instruction No. 12 in effect in'Structed the 
jury that plaintiff was not covered by nor entitled to re-
ceive insurance procee:ds as a result of his injuries. The 
great bulk -of litigation in connection with the right of in-
jured employees to recover under the Workmen's Com-
pensation laws of the various states, 2253 p·ages in the 
4th American Decennial Digest and 3452 pages in the 
5t.h Ame:ricam Decemnial Digest, would certainly indicate 
that the Workmen's C·ompensation laws ·do not insure 
employees. In this connection it is interesting to note the 
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language of Mr. J'u'Stice Murphy in Ca~rd,illo v. Liber'ty 
Mut. Ins. Co., (decided Mar. 10, 19'47), 330 U.S. 469, 67 
S. Ct. 801, 807: 
"* * * The statutory phrase 'arising out of 
and in the course of employment,' which appears 
in most workmen's compensation laws, is decep-
tively simple and litigiously prolific." 
The vice of admitting evidence that a defendant 
carries insurance is that the jury will then know that an 
insurance companiy will pay the judgment. Defendants 
contend this is prejudicial from two standpoints. {1) 
Supposed prejudice of juries against a large corporation 
or an insurance corporation and the likelihood that the 
jury would be more apt to return H verdict and a larger 
one against such corporation than the individual. (2) 
The insurance company representing the defendant and 
that will have to pay the judgment does not like to lose 
the sympathy which the jury ma.y have for the individual 
defendant both as to the matter of the verdict and its 
size. Lawyers and insurance companies naturally feel 
that the verdict \vill not be as large against an individual 
defendant as it would if the jury knew an Insurance 
company would have to pay the judgment. 
When non-insurance of defendant is introduced it is 
the plaintiff who claims a foul has been committed. He 
is hopeful that with no mention of insurance the jury 
may think (casualty insurance being a common thing) 
defendant has insurance and render a verdict according-
ly. Then too, if we should start telling the jurors that 
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there was no insurance in certain cases they would con-
clude that when it is not mentioned then the defendant 
is insured. 
·Obviously these same reasons do not apply in the 
case at bar. Whether under workmen's compensation or 
F'ederal Employers' Liability Act the railroad will pay. 
No one claims, certainly railroad counsel never has, that 
there is more ·prejudice against an insurance company 
than a railroad company. Both are corporations and 
both are considered wealthy. 
The purpose to be served by this instruction is to 
inform the jury that there is oniy one remedy and the 
more familiar worlanen's compensation remedy is not 
available to this plaintiff. This instruction allays any 
thought that plaintiff has another remedy or should 
have pursued another one. 
The only prejudice conceivable out of the entire 
situation would be the possible prejudice an uninformed 
jury might have against a person they mistakenly 
thought ha:d gone to court with a elaim against his em-
ployer even though said person was entitled to bring 
proceedings under workmen's compensation and should 
be relegated to that remedy. It was to ·avoid this poten-
tial prejudice and to insure a verdict based upon the la'v 
and the evidence that the trial court gave cautionary 
Instruction No. 12. 
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Defendant does not contend that this is an incorrect 
statement of the law. It is a cautionary instruction not 
to divert but to keep the attention of the jurors on the 
issues. Should jurors he the only ones ignorant of a 
phase of the law which may play a part in their delibera-
tions~ It was for this same reason that the Court gave its 
Instruction No. 20 wherein it stated (R. 311): 
"The Railroad Company is not an insurer of 
the safety of any of its employees. * * *" 
No one contended that it was an insurer. By Instruction. 
No. 6 the jurors were instructed to consider the case in 
the same manner as between two individuals (R. 298). 
These types of instructions are of a cautionary nature. 
Their purpose is to direct the jury's views away from 
extraneous matters that might in some way pr~judice 
their minds and toward the law and the evidence of the 
case at hand in order that justice may he done between 
the parties. 
This Court has discussed the subject of whether an 
instruction, such as the one here involved, is prejudicial 
in Br11!1'her v. McCarthy (decided Oct. 25, 1943), 105 Utah 
399, 142 P. 2d 649, 655·: 
''While instruction 16, in which the jury 
was told that the plaintiff was engaged at the 
time of the accident in interstate commerce and 
that the ease was therefore governed by Federal 
rather than State law, may have been unnecessary 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
44 
in that the source of the law was not necessarily 
·a concern of the jury, it could in no way prejudice· 
th~ defendants." 
We submit this instruction was properly given and 
certainly was not error, prejudicial or otherwise. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN GIVING INS'TRU·CTION NO. 13. 
For the convenience of the Court, we set forth herein 
Instruction No. 13 ·(R .. 305) : 
'''The Federal Employers' Liability Act pro-
vides as follows: 
" 'That in any action brought .against any 
common carrier under or by virtue of any of 
the provisions of this chapter to recover 
damages for injuries to, * * * any of its em-
ployees, such employee· shall not be held to 
have assumed the risks of his em·ployment in 
any case where such injury * * * resulted 
in whole or in part from the negligence of any 
of the officers, agents, or employees of such 
earrier; * * *'." 
The foregoing instruction incorporates the e-xact lan-
guage of 45 U.S.C.A., S.ection 54. That statute in its 
present form was enacted into law on August 11, 1939, 
and even though the Act in clear and unequivocal terms 
eliminated the defense of assumption of risk, various 
hostile courts undertook to revive that defense under 
other labels, such as that of non-negligence. 
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In the case of Tiller v. Atlantic CooJst Line R. Co., 
318 U.S. 54, 63 S. Ct. 444, 45'1, 87 L. Ed. 610, the United 
States Supreme Court declared: 
"The doctrine of assumption of risk cannot 
be 'abolished in toto' and still remain in partial 
existence as the court below suggests. The theory 
that a servant is completely barred from recovery 
for injury resulting from his master's negligence, 
which legislatures have sought to eliminate in all 
its various forms of contributory negligence, the 
fellow servant rule, and assumption of risk, must 
not, contrary to the will of Congress, be allowed 
recrudescence under any other label in the com-
mon law lexicon." 
Counsel state in the Brief of Appellant at page 32 
that "whether or not the plaintiff does or does not assume 
the risk is immaterial * * *." However, during the trial 
the same counsel cross-examined plaintiff as follows 
(R. 107) : 
''Q. You had seen this particular tire prior to 
the time that you went to do this loading, had 
you not~ 
A. Ye·s. 
Q. And you knew just exactly what kind of tire 
you were going to go get~ 
A. Yes." 
The foregoing cross-examination constituted an invi-
tation to the jury to reason that because plaintiff had 
seen this particular tire before and because he knew 
exactly what the prohlems were in connection with lift-
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ing and moving the tire he assumed the risks involved. 
This was an attempt to revive the doctrine of assump-
tion of risk under a new guise, which was condemned 
by the Tiller case. 
Counsel took still another step in the face of the 
Tille!r case in his requested Instruction No. 8, which be-
came the tria:l court's Instruction No. 22. That instruc-
tion reads as follows (R. 312) : 
"The plaintiff, Moore, had a duty in his work 
for the railroad, to exercise reasonable care for 
his own safety. If you believe by a p~reponderance 
of the evidence that plaintiff, at the time of his 
accident, knew, or in the exercise of reasonable 
care, should have known that the manner in which 
he was bracing the tractor tire would or might 
result in injury to himself, and that plaintiff 
nevertheless p-roceeded or continued to so brace 
said tire, then you must fin·d the plaintiff guilty 
of negligence in this case." 
The foregoing instruction would seem to indicate 
that if plaintiff's conduct in bracing the tire ''could or 
might result in injury to hin1self" then the plaintiff was 
guilty of negligence. Instruction No. 13, however, comes 
into play and declares in effect that if Nichols, the Huff 
Loader operator, negligently backed the tractor, the 
plaintiff would not assmne the risk oeca.sioned by that 
incident. 
The trial court gave defendant's requested Instruc-
tion No. 11 in its Instruction No. 20, wherein it is stated 
(R. 3'11) : 
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"The Railroad Company is not an insurer of 
the safety of any of its ·employees. It is not liable 
to respond in damages merely because the plain-
tiff, Moore, sustained some injury while working 
as a section hand or merely because he was em-
ployed by the Railroad Company. * * *" 
The foregoing is a correct statement of the law. In-
struction No. 13 on assumption ·of risk states the converse 
of that proposition that although the railroad is not an 
insurer, nevertheless neither does the employee assume 
risks and dangers in connection with his work which are 
occasioned by the negligence of the employer. 
It would seem altogether proper that the jury should 
be fully instructed on these matters in order that they 
not depart from the law as pronounced by the Court to a 
speculative reasoning that if a workman does not like 
the task to which he is assigned, he is free to quit, and 
therefore, if there are dangers in connection with that 
task he assumes the risk of those dangers even though 
they are occasioned by negligence of the railroad com-
pany. 
It is our contention and firm belief that in view of 
counsel's cross-examination of plaintiff, bringing out 
that he had seen this particular tire and was well ac-
quainted with the kind of tire he was ordered to load, 
together with Instruction No. 22 to the effect that plain-
tiff would be negligent if he knew, or should have known, 
that the manner in which he was bracing the tractor tire 
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would or might result in injury to him, and also InstruC-
tion No. 20 to the effect that the railroad was not an in-
surer and that negligence must be proven, demanded and 
required Instruction No. 13 to clearly place before the 
jury the respective rights and responsibilities of the par-
ties. Plaintiff was entitled to a clear-cut instruction that 
he ·did not assume the risks occasioned by the negligence 
of Nichols, the Huff Loader operator. 
Instruet1ons similar to Instruction No. 13 have been 
considered by a number of courts. In Atlantic Coast 
Line R. Co. v. Burkett (decided Nov. 16·, 1951, 5th Cir.), 
19'2 F .. 2d 941, 943 plaintiff was injured when he fell over 
a pile of scrap iron and other debris while helping a fel-
low workman carry a rail. The trial court charged the 
jury as follows: 
''' :!(~ * * 'I charge you further, gentlemen of 
the jury, that in any action brought against any 
common carrier under or by virtue of any of the 
provisions of this chapter to recover damages for 
injuries to any of its emploiJees, such employee 
shall not be held to have assumed the risks of his 
employment in .any case where such injury re-
sulted in whole· or in part from the negligence of 
any of the officers, agents, or en1ployees of such 
carrier.' '' 
The F'ifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the giv-
ing of said instruction in the following language (p. 943) : 
"Under the pleadings and evidence in this 
case, we think that the trial judge was justified 
in thinking that in the absence of a cl1arge on as-
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sumption of risk, the jury might have considered 
that defense under the guise of nonnegligence. 
As said in the Tiller case, supra (318 U.S. 54, 
63 S. Ct. 447) : 
" 'Unless great care be taken, the ser-
vant's rights will be sacrificed by simply 
charging him with assumption of risk under 
another name.' " 
In Curtis v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., (decided 
Dec. 8, 1952), 253 S. W. 2d 789, 79·4, the Supreme Court 
of Missouri stated: 
"Defendant complains of instruction 6 which 
in substance informed the jury that the suit was 
based on the Federal Employers' Liability Act and 
concluded by advising the jury that the deceased 
'S1hall not be held to have assumed the risks of 
his employment.' Defendant says this instruction 
injected a foreign issue into the case. The. cases 
cited in support of defendant's contention are 
cases such a.s Gray v. Columbia Terminals Co., 331 
Mo. 73, 52 S.W. 2d 809, where the court held it 
was error for the court to give an instruction for 
the defendant which injected contributory negli-
gence in a humanitarian case as a defense·. Such 
cases are not in point. 
"We have had cases sin1ilar to the one now 
·before us. See Ford v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 355 
Mo. 362, 196 s .. W. 2d 163, loc. cit. 168 (7) (8), 
where we held that such an instruction did not 
inject a foreign issue into the case. In Abernathy 
v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., Mo. Sup., 237 
S.W. 2d 161, loc. cit. 163(2), we held that such 
an instruction tended to keep a foreign issue out 
of the case. 
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"Plaintiff's principal instruction authorized 
a plaintiff's verdict only if the jury found de-
ceased came to his death through the negligence 
of the defendant. A defendant's instruction told 
the jury that the burden was on plaintiff to prove 
her case ; that the defendant under the F'ederal 
Act was not an insurer of the safety of its em-
ployees ; also that the mere fact Curtis was in-
jured did not authorize a verdict for plaintiff. 
In the circumstances, we hold the giving of in-
struction 6 was not prejudicially erroneous." 
In the ease of _Meierotto v. Thompson (S. Ct. of 
Mo., decided Mar. 10, 19;47), 201 S·.W. 2d 161, an action 
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act for personal 
injury, it appeared ·that while plaintiff was attempting 
to make repairs to a pip·e carrying exhaust steam into 
the water tank of an engine, he had suffered physical 
in·juries when water rushed out of the pipe with great 
force, throwing dirt and grease about his face. The trial 
-court gave an instruction on assumption of risk in sub-
stantially the same language a.s did this Court in In-
struction No. 13. The Supreme Court of Missouri held 
that the giving of the instruction did not constitute error. 
See also Laughter v. Powell (S. Ct. N.C., decided May 
13, 19·41), 219 N.C. 6S9, 14 S.E. 2·d 826 (Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari denied by United S:tates Supreme Court 
62 S. Ct. 128). 
Not only was the giving of Instruction No. 13 par-
ticularly appropriate under the facts and circumstances 
of this case, but the giving of such an instruction in any 
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case could in no way prejudice a defendant railroad 
com·pany where an action is brought under the Federal 
Employers' Liability Act. 
Counsel for defendant has quoted from the Brwner 
case supra, but has not included the entire statement 
of this Court on the subject (p. 655) : 
'''The same holds true as to instruction 11 
on the 'assumption of risk' doctrine. No such issue 
was raised by the pleadings or the evidence and 
no good purpose could have been served by the 
giving of such an instruction. Yet this could not 
be prejudicial to the defendants, for even if the 
jury inferred from the giving of such an instruc-
tion that the doctrine of 'assumption of risk' ap-
plied, the defendants could not have been preju-
diced. If they had thought that the plaintiff had 
possibly assumed the risk, it would have been to 
the defendants' benefit not to their disadvantage· 
or prejudice." 
POINT IV. 
THE JURY'S VERDICT WAS NOT SO EXCESSIVE AS 
TO INDICATE THAT IT WAS DICTAT-ED BY PASSION OR 
PREJUDICE. 
No contention IS made in the Brief of Appellant 
that the jury was guilty of any act of misconduct or that 
counsel was guilty of any conduct calculated to or hav-
ing the effect of inflaming the minds of the jury. 
The sole ·claim is that the amount of the verdict in 
view of the evidence of injury and damage established 
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that the jury was influenced by passion and prejudice. 
The governing considerations on this issue have been 
clearly defined by this Court in Pauly v. McCarthy et ,al., 
109 Utah 39'8, 184 P. 2d 123, 126, 127, where it is stated: 
'"Where we can say, as a matter of law, that 
the verdict was so excessive as to appear to have 
·been given under the influence- of passion or pre-
judice, and the trial court abused its discretion 
or acted arbitrarily or capriciously in denying a 
motion for a new trial, we may order the verdict 
set aside, and a new trial granted. Jensen v. D. 
& R. G. Ry. Co., sup·ra, and other cases cited above 
following that decision. But mere excessiveness 
of a verdict, without more, does not necessarily 
show that the verdict was arrived at by passion or 
prHjudice. Stephens Ranch & Livestock Co. v. U. 
P. Ry. ~Co., supra. It is true that the verdict might 
be so grossly excessive and disproportionate to 
the injury that we could say from that fact alone 
that as a matter of law the verdict must have 
been arrived at by passion or prejudice. But the 
facts must be such that the excess can be deter-
mined as a matter of law, or the verdict must be 
so excessive as to be shocking to one's conscience 
and to clearly indicate passion, prejudice, or cor-
ruption on the part of the jury. McAffee v. Ogden 
Union Ry. & Depot Co., supra; Ward v. D. & 
R. G. W. Ry. Co., supra. This is not such a case. 
,, 'The verdict here was admittedly liberal. 
But the mere fact that it was more than another 
jury, or more than this court Inight have given, 
or even more than the evidence justified, does 
not conclusively show that it was the result of 
passion, prejudice, or corruption on the part of 
the jury. 
* * * * 
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"The jury is allowed great latitude in as-
sessing damages for personal injuries. Miller v. 
·so. Pac. Co., 82 Utah 46·, 21 P. 2d 865. The pre-
sent cost of living and the diminished purchasing 
power of the dollar may be taken into considera-
tion when estimating damages. 'Coke v Timby, 
57 Utah 53, 19'2 P. 624; McAfee v. Ogden Union 
Ry. & Depot C·o., sup·ra. 
"We can discover nothing in this case, ex-
cept the amount of the verdict, which indi'cates 
passion or prejudice, and, as we have seen, pas-
sion and prejudice are not necessarily inferred 
from an excessive verdict, without more. No ex-
ce·ption was taken to the jury or any member 
thereof. No conduct on the part of the jury, 
evincing passion and prejudice has been called 
to our attention. The only point of complaint is 
the size of verdict." 
The Court went on to say (p·. 1'25): 
·"* * * But, although we have the power to 
order a new trial in case of an excessive verdict, 
it is a power which we have rarely, if ever, exer-
cised." 
~counsel for defendant, throughout the Brief of Ap-
pellant, has cast the evidence in a light most favorable 
to the defendant. For example, counsel has stated at 
page 35 of their ·brief that Moore's employment before 
his injury was unsteady. Moore is only qualified by 
education and experience to work as a laboring man. 
T'he labor market is a shifting market. Many types of 
employment are seasonal. The evidence reveals that 
Moore had an excellent work record from the time he 
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left the tenth grade of school to the date of his in·jury. 
He isn't the kind of man who would lay around. When 
one job terminated he found another (R .. 9-1'2). 
ICounsel states at page 37 of his brief: 
'·'On the evening of the alleged injury Moore 
asked his foreman, F·oster, for a 30 day leave of 
a;bsenee to put up his hay (R.. 209·-·210, compare 
with R. 112)." 
~Moore testified that he did not ask for such a leave 
of absence (R. 112). Furthermore, no leave of absence 
wa.s offered in evidence hy defendant to substantiate the 
biased witness, Foster's, testimony. The jury found in 
Moore's favor on this issue. 
~C'ounsel suggests at page 38 of his brief that Moore 
'·'was boxing with the high school boys" during the F'all 
of 1951. Moore, of course, testified that he did not box 
with the boys (R. 124). App·arently counsel has the im-
pression that this app·ellate court should determine the 
credibility of witnesses. 
~Counsel su·ggests at p·age 38 of his brief: 
~'In May of 195·3, Moore went to work for the 
'Cater Construction Co. and worked ten and one-
half hours per day at least five days per week 
doi~g extremely heavy manual labor (hauling and 
sett1ng poles) and yet never complained about his 
hack (Ex. 9, R. 317)." 
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~The foregoing statement is contrary to the evidence 
most favorable to Moore which is, that he was unable 
to work steady because of his back condition, and that 
during an ordinary work week he would work two or 
three days and lay off a few days (R. 149·, 150). 
Counsel states at page 41 of his brief: 
''No medical expenses were alleged or 
proved." 
It is true that plaintiff did not pray for medical ex-
penses in his complaint. This does not mean, however, 
that he was not receiving medical care and treatment. 
The evidence is that Moore received treatments from 
Dr. Thomas N. Sims, at Eagle, Colorado, on several 
occasions shortly after his injuries (R. 224, 225). That 
in January of 1952 he sought medical care and treat-
ment from Dr. Livingston, at Glenwood S:prings, who 
advised him not to lift more than five or ten pounds for 
a year (R. 38, 39). That in February or March of 1952 
he sought assistance fron1 Dr. Nutting at Glenwood 
Springs, Colorado (R. 40). That in March of 1952 he 
sought 1nedical assistance and treatment from Dr. Hines, 
at Denver, Colorado, and that Dr. Hines turned him 
over to Dr. Ellis, an orthopedic surgeon, who advised 
the use of a eanvas belt with heavy stays (R. 42). That 
thereafter he sought assistance· from Dr. Hoover, an 
orthopedic surgeon, and Dr. Fuller, at Salida, Colorado; 
that during this time he was wearing the canvas belt 
and taking hot baths for his back condition (R. 43). That 
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he also sought medical assistance from Dr. Newman, an 
orthope~dic surgeon, a.t Denver, Colorado, and Dr. Grant 
Young, an orthopedist from Denver, Colorado (R. 44). 
During the two years and ten months between his 
injury and the second trial, Moore had seen a total of 
ten ·doctors in an effort to obtain relief for his back 
condition. 
'Counsel for defendant makes the following state-
ment at page 37 of his brief: 
"The undisputed evidence including plain-
tiff's own medical testimony, however, directly 
opp~oses the conclusion that Moore was seriously 
injured." 
A review of the evidence indicates the fallacy of 
couns·el's statement. 
[twill be recalled that Moore was injured on August 
9, 19·5,1, when he suffered a severe strain to his back. He 
was able, with some difficulty, to continue with his work 
until the end of the shift (R. 34). He complained to his 
fellow workmen and to his assistant foren1an that he 
h'ad injured his back. That evening he had extreme dif-
ficulty sleeping (R,. 3'5). The second work day following 
his injury he filed an accident report and received a slip 
to be examined by Dr. Sims, at Eagle, Color:ado (R. 36, 
37). The doctor found a "lesion" or "deviation" from 
the normal of the right hip (R. 224, 225). For a p·eriod 
of four to six weeks thereafte-r he would ''work a day 
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or two and have to lay off" (R. 37). After four to six 
weeks he was forced to lay off work altogether (R. 37). 
F'rom that time until the second trial Moore had been 
in constant quest of relief for the condition of his hack. 
He had "practically worn out" a -canvas back support. 
He had been sleeping on the floor in a sleeping hag be-
cause of his back condition. He had worked only spora-
dically. He was forced to terminate his employment with 
the railroad -company because of his back condition. 
After working for Vern Davis approximately two months 
he was forced to quit because of his back condition (R. 
48, 126). After working for Cater Construction Com-
pany three months he was forced to quit because he was. 
unable to work steady (R. 48, 130). Although he re-
mained employed by D-eardon Lumber Company for a 
period of eight and one-half months, he was unable to 
work steady because of his back condition (R. 49, 150). 
On several occasions Moore had actually passed out on 
the job because of his back condition. On one occasion 
he had fallen against a saw and cut his hand (R. 50, 51). 
He \Vas employed by the Decker Trucking Company, 
Green River, Utah, at the time of trial, but testified he 
was having extreme difficulty with his back and wonder-
ed how long he would be able to continue in that employ-
ment (R. 53). 
Dr. Clegg testified that the history of injury and 
symptoms coupled with the muscle spasm, the x-ray 
changes in the area of the lumbosacral joint, the history 
of exacerbations and remissions which had been char-
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acteristic of Moore's hack since his injury fit the patter~ 
of a disc injury. It is also interesting to note Dr. Clegg's 
testimony that Moore had one..:half inch atrophe of the 
right leg (R. 70) in the light of his furth·er testimony 
that Moore had a sensory loss on the medial side of his 
right foot indicating nerve root p-ressure, and Moore's 
own testimony that ever since his injury he had suffered 
from numbness and pain extending down his right leg. 
Viewed in the light of the foregoing circumstances the 
narrowing of the interspace at the lumbosacral joint 
becomes extremely significant. The doctor gave his op-
inion that Moore had a five per cent permanent p1art~al 
d:isability of his back (R. 6'2-67). He further stated that 
subsequent exacerbations and remissions could be· ex-
pected; that lifting would be the most difficult activity 
for Moore in view of his hack condition (R. 78). 
The jury had every right to believe from the fore-
going evidence that Moore had suffered extensive phy-
sical pain since his injury. The jury had every right to 
believe that he would continue to suffer frorn physical 
pain in the future. Moore had a wife and adopted child. 
The jury had a right to believe that his physical injury, 
the long p·eriod of ina~bility to earn a livelihood because 
of his physical. condition, and the worry over whether 
he woul.d be able to earn a livelihood for himself and 
his family, had caused and would continue to cause him 
to suffer mental pain. 
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·Concerning the evidence of loss of bodily function, 
we call attention to the fact that Moore suffered a per-
manent partial disability of his back amounting to 5%. 
It will be recalled that he had enjoyed excellent health 
and a perfect body before he was injured. 
'Counsel has suggested in his brief (p'. 41) : 
·"Had t'he jury believed all of Moore's testi-
mony, we feel that they could not have awarded 
in excess of $1,000.00 for loss of wages." 
~The evidence, however, is contrary to counsel's hope-
ful suggestion. 
During the seventeen months that Moore had been 
working steadily for The Denver and Rio Grande West-
ern Railroad Company prior to his injury he was earning 
an average of $256.00 per month (R. 13). During the 
two years and ten months between his injury and the 
second trial Moore earned the following amounts : 
The D·enver and Rio Grande 
Western Railroad Company ____ $ 
Vern Davis ------------------------------------
·Cater Construction Company ___ _ 
Deardon Lumber Company _______ _ 
Decker Trucking Company --------
100.00 
400.00 
500.00 
1,000.00 
390.00 
TotaL _______________________ $2,390. 00 
~Average monthly income $70.'29, on average loss of 
monthly income of 185.71. 
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If Moore had continued his employment with The 
Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, 
which was his intention, during the same p,eriod he would 
have earned $'256.00 per month, or a total of $8,704.00. 
Consequently the jury -could well have found, and no 
doubt did find, that his lost earnings at the time of trial 
were approximately $6,314.00. 
·Likewise, the jury was entitled to find that Moore 
would continue to suffer from diminution in his earning 
capa;city throughout his life expectancy. 
In Schl,atter v. McCarthy et al., (decided Aug. 2'3, 
1948), 113 Utah 543, 19·6 P. 2d 9·68, 973, the Court stated: 
"* * * The extent of the disability to a limb 
or other part of the human machine is not gener-
ally the measure of the extent of the impairment 
of earning capacity. A few examples will illus-
trate: A 50% permanent disability of the left 
hand of a practicing lawyer would probably not 
imp·air his earning capacity to the extent of 50%. 
He would still be able to interview clients, to read 
cases, to walk to and from the court room, and 
to p!erform all of the other duties ordinarily inci-
dent to the practice of his profession. ·On the 
other hand, a 50% permanent disability of the 
left hand of a concert pianist "\vould probably 
amount to a total impairment of his earning 
capacity. So also, permanent disfiguring injur-
ies, even of a slight nature, might result in al-
most total impairment of earning capacity of a 
professional actress or model, whereas serious 
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disfigurement, unless a.ccon1pa.nied by loss of 
bodily function, would hardly impair at all the 
earning capacity of a day laborer." 
'The evidence was that Moore had only a tenth grade 
education; that during his lifetime he had pursued only 
those tasks involving strenuous physical exertion, and 
requiring a strong solid hack. He had worked handling 
shipments, feeding cattle, pitching hay, handling spike 
maul and shovel, driving truck and as a lumberjack. 
His qualifications limited him to heavy manual labor 
tasks. It is true that a lawyer, doctor or musician might 
very well have had no diminution in his earning capacity 
from an injury such as that which Moore sustained, but 
this is the case of Alfred Roger Moore. The evidence 
fully justified a finding that he had sustained a serious. 
and permanent impairment in his earning capacity. At 
the time of trial Moore "\vas 34 years of age, and accord-
ing to the Commissioner's 1941 Standard Ordinary Mor-
tality Table, had an expectancy of life of 34.29 years 
(R. 309). 
Using the foregoing life expectancy and discounting 
at 3¥2% interest, it would take the sum of $11,964.00 
to pay Moore $50.00 per month for the remainder of his 
expected life. 
Nobody has an unvariable measuring rod for the 
money value of loss of future earnings, pain and suffer-
ing, or loss of bodily function. This is the very reason 
why such matters are and should be left under proper 
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instruction to the sound discretion of the jury. We sug-
gest the following figures merely as one reasonable way 
justified by the evidence that the jury ·could have arrived 
at their verdict: 
·Loss of past earnings ----------·------$ 6,314.00 
Past pain and suffering, 
physical an·d mental -------------- 7,500.00 
Loss. of future earnings ------------ 11,964.00 
($50.00 p·er month discounted 
at 3-lh% interest over life 
expectancy of 34.29 years) 
Future pain and suffering, 
mental and physical -------------- 4,611.00 
·Loss of bodily function, 
past and future ---------------------- 4,611.00 
TotaL __________________________ .$35, 000.00 
In Duffy v. Union Pacific R. Co., (Utah, decided 
May 17, 1950), 118 Utah 82, 218 P. 2d 1080, this Court 
recognized its power to require a remittitur or a new 
trial where a jury's verdict appeared to have been given 
under the influenc-e of p~assion and prejudice. This 
Court has exercised that right but very sparingly es-
pecially wh·ere it app·ears that the trial court has denied 
a motion for new trial on the ground of excessiveness 
of the verdict. 
1The trial court in the case at bar denie-d the motion 
for a new trial thereby placing its stamp of approval 
upon the amount of the verdict return-e-d by the jury. 
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~As stated in Stephens Ranch & Live Stock Co., v. 
Union Pac. R. Co., 48 Utah 52:8, 161 Pac. 459, 462: 
"* * * Necessarily upon such a question ap-
pellate courts must, to a large extent, rely upon 
the judgment and discretion of the trial court. 
That court is in a much better position to observe 
and determine whether a jury was actuated by 
passion or prejudice, or by both, in returning a 
verdict for an amount larger than the evidence 
justifies, or whether the jury was merely mis-
taken with regard to the amount that should have 
been allowed." 
'Counsel for defendant come to this Court almost 
four years after plaintiff was injured and following two 
adverse verdicts, making ·fhe claim that the jury's ver-
dict was motivated by passion and prejudice, and that 
the trial court was guilty of abuse of discretion in deny-
ing the motion for new trial. Under these circumstances 
the language of Jensern v. Denver and R. G. R. Co., 44 
Utah 100, 138 Pac. 1185, 1192, is particularly appropriate: 
"Neither is either party on that question (on 
damages) entitled to the judgment of the court 
below in a case of tort tried to a jury. Both par-
ties, as to that, are entitled to the unprejudiced 
judgment of the jury. That is exclusively within 
their province. Their power and discretion, when 
prop·erly exercised and when they have been pro-
perly directed as to the measure of damages and 
the mode of assessing it, may not be interfered 
with merely because the court above or below 
may think the amount rendered is too large, or 
even may think it appears to be larger than the 
evidence apparently or fairly justifies. A court, 
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va~cating a verdict and granting a new trial by 
merely setting up his opinion or judgment against 
that of the jury, but usurps judicial power and 
prostitutes the constitutional trial by jury. Still 
the jury cannot be. permitted to go unbridled and 
unchecked. Hence the Code that a new trial on 
motion of the aggrieved party may be granted 
1hy the court below on the ground of 'excessive 
damages ap:pearing to have been given unde-r the 
influence of p~assion or prejudice.' Whenever that 
is made to appear, the court, when its action is 
properly invoked, should require a remission or 
set the verdict aside and grant a new trial. B~t, 
before the court is justified to do that, it should 
clearly be made to ap·p·ear that the jury totally 
mistook or disregarded the rules of law by whieh 
the damages were to be regulated, or wholly mis-
con'ceived or disregarded all the evidence, and by 
so doing committed gross and palpable error by 
rendering a verdict so enormous or outrageous 
or unjust as to be attributable to neither the 
charge nor the evidence, but only to passion or 
prejudice. Whether a new trial should or should 
not be granted on this ground, of necessity, must 
largely rest within the sound discretion of the 
trial court." 
A thought is suggested by Justice Wolfe in his con-
curring opinion in Bentr~tett v. Denver & Rio Grande 
West-ern R. Co., 117 Utah 57, 213 P. 2d 32·5. 
We submit that more \Vas taken off for contributory 
negligence than vvas justified by the evidence. The jury 
found that fifty p·er cent of the negligence \vas that of 
plaintiff. The net verdi'Ct was $17,500. Justice Wolfe 
in his opinion stated as follows (p. 332): 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
65 
"Also, it is quite possible that the jury may 
have taken too much from the verdict for the 
plaintiff's contributory negligence. And from 
this the plaintiff has no recourse. It is quite 
likely that the jury looks at these eases realisti-
caHy by determining what net amount the plain-
tiff should receive to see him decently through 
life and then makes the verdict high enough so 
that its guess as to the amount the plaintiff should 
be penalized for his contributory negligence when 
substracted (sic) will bring the verdict to the 
amount they think he should receive. Of course, 
such mental operations cannot he proved and are 
not in accord with the purpose of the act, but it 
is very difficult to prevent a jury from so arriv-
ing at a verdict in this fashion. And if so, as 
before stated, the amount which t1he jury may sub-
tract for contributory negligence, if it finds there 
was such, may be excessive but the net verdict 
may itself be not out of the way. 
"Present verdicts doubtless seem very high 
in view of past experience in this state, but it is 
just as valid a conclusion that injured men may 
have been awarded too little in the past as it is 
that they are awarded too much now. Perhaps 
both are the cas-e. In view of present cost of liv-
ing and continuing inflation, I cannot say that 
the verdict is excessive." 
The verdict here comes with the stamp of approval 
of the District Court and theTe is nothing to show that 
the verdict resulted from passion or prejudice and if 
the jury gave credence, which they must have done, to 
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the testimony of plaintiff regarding the extent and seri-
ousness of his injuries, then the verdict returned is not 
e:xcess1ve. 
·This case has now been tried twice. The verdict in 
the first trial was for $12,000. The case was again tried 
and a net verdict in favor of plaintiff returned in the 
amount o:f $17,500. 
D·efendant makes no contention that the evidence 
1s not sufficient to permit a finding by the jury that 
defendant was negligent in that the op~erator of the Huff 
loader permitted it. to hack up because of a failure to 
keep the brake on. The only assignments of error relate 
to instructions given. or refused and to a claimed exces-
siveness of the verdict. 
We submit that under the foregoing cases and au-
thorities there is no prejudicial error present. Under 
Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, it is necessary 
that the alleged error be inconsistent with substantial 
justice and it must affect the substantial rights of the 
parties. We submit that any errors assigned do not come 
within this rule. We believe that the damages assessed 
by the jury are not excessive and that certainly no bias 
or prejudice can be attributed to the verdict of the jury. 
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We submit the judgment appealed from and which 
has the approval of the District Court, should be af-
firmed. 
Respectfuily submitted, 
RAWLINGS~, WALLACE 
ROBERT1S & BLA,CK 
Cownsel for Respondent 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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' A. D·. 1955. 
Counsel for Appellant 
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